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ABSTRACT: In recent times a great deal of attention is being paid to the repercussions that 
the appearance of California as a new supplier of “Mediterranean products” had over the 
traditional producer countries located on the Mediterranean rim. The paper focuses on 
orange farming and starts with a comparison between the California and the Spanish citrus 
industries. While the former specialised in the production of high quality fruit, in the latter 
groves generated huge amounts of lower quality and cheaper oranges. The paper 
investigates why the Spanish growers – chiefly small and middle farmers – followed this 
line, and looks into the results of this kind of behaviour. It concludes that the methods used 
by Spanish farmers enabled them to resist the competition from California quite well, and 
that orange farming was a very profitable business in Spain during the period that is 
studied. 
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  RESUMEN: Desde hace algún tiempo se está prestando una gran atención a las 
repercusiones que tuvo sobre los países situados a orillas del Mar Mediterráneo la 
emergencia de California como un nuevo gran productor y exportador de “productos 
mediterráneos”. El artículo dirige su atención hacia la citricultura y comienza haciendo una 
comparación entre la agricultura naranjera de California y la de España. Mientras que la 
primera se especializó en la producción de fruta de calidad muy elevada, en España los 
huertos valencianos generaban una enorme cantidad de naranja barata de baja calidad 
media. En el trabajo se investiga por qué los agricultores naranjeros españoles – que eran 
principalmente pequeños y medianos explotadores – adoptaron ese comportamiento, y se 
analiza los resultados que tal actuación produjo. Se concluye que los productores españoles 
pudieron resistir de manera bastante efectiva la competencia que les planteaba California, y 
que la producción de naranjas fue un negocio muy rentable en España durante el periodo 
considerado. 
 
PALABRAS CLAVE: Naranjas, Cítricos, California, Valencia, Pequeña explotación 
 
 
N50,  N53,   Q13,  Q15 
   4
“The Anticalifornia”. Family farming, prices and quality product in 










  Spanish orange farming has traditionally been considered to be one of the most 
dynamic agricultures within the Mediterranean area. Although it has not been refuted, that 
image has, however, been somewhat eroded since comparisons started to be made with 
California.
1 In the late nineteenth century California became a great producer of citrus 
fruits, walnuts, almonds, raisins, prunes and many other crops that up till then had only 
been grown on a large scale on the Mediterranean rim. After capturing the U.S. domestic 
market, California growers began to export and increase their market share in Europe. 
Southern Europe, which depended so much on its agricultural exports in order to keep up 
with the industrialised nations, would have been the loser. According to Morilla, Olmstead 
and Rhode’s counterfactual analysis, just the lost citrus revenues suffered by the 
Mediterranean exporters “would have been sufficient to support about 312 000 people at 
the average per capita income levels prevailing in Spain and Italy circa 1910”.
2 Despite 
reconsidering some of the assumptions of these authors, Pinilla and Ayuda reach a similar 
conclusion: in 1910 the Spanish GDP would have been 0.8 per cent higher than it was.
3 
  Practically from its very beginnings, the Spanish citrus industry was characterised 
by its own protests about its situation, which may give the impression that it was 
permanently immersed in a state of crisis, but the amount of land devoted to oranges did 
not stop increasing. The fragment that follows, taken from a report written in 1908, 
                                                 
1 Morilla, Olmstead and Rhode, “Horn of Plenty”; Olmstead and Rhode, “El desarrollo”; Olmstead and 
Rhode, “La competencia”. 
2 Morilla, Olmstead and Rhode, “Horn of Plenty”, p. 345. 
3 Pinilla and Ayuda, “‘Horn of Plenty’ revisited”, p. 33.   5
illustrates the reasoning of Spanish growers: “The appalling decline in wines has coincided 
with an enormous drop in exports; in contrast, the decline of the orange becomes more and 
more pronounced every year despite the fact that exports are rising steadily. In twelve years 
they have doubled”.
4 The writer points out that the average unit price of the Spanish export 
of orange followed a downward trend over those twelve years, but does not explain that per 
unit production costs had also dropped.
5 In actual fact, in the Valencian Region (the most 
important area of production in Spain) the orange was for many years the most profitable 
investment.
6 
  The counterfactual analyses carried out to date have sought to estimate what would 
have happened in Mediterranean Europe without the existence of competition from the 
American growers of “Mediterranean products”. In the conclusions to this paper I am going 
to defend that this makes as much sense (or nonsense) as attempting to evaluate how much 
California failed to grow due to the presence of the Spanish citrus industry. As a first step 
towards dealing with this issue, the first section of the paper offers a comparison of the 
citrus industries in California and Valencia. The second section looks at the evolution of 
Spanish citrus farming before the 1936-39 Civil War. The third section investigates why 
many Valencian peasants became orange growers. Lastly, the fourth section considers why 
most of them produced large amounts of poor quality fruit and examines how they did it, 
with special attention being paid to the fertilising techniques used and the role played by 
cooperatives. 
 
CALIFORNIA AND SPAIN 
 
  The first Valencian grove exclusively dedicated to orange trees is supposed to have 
been planted in 1781 in Carcaixent (Valencia). At first few dared to follow step and, 
although more groves did begin to appear in the 1840s, the Spanish citrus industry did not 
                                                 
4 Lassala, Nuestra exportación, p. 15. 
5 Expressed 1913 pesetas, over the period 1895-1900 Spain received an average of 199.6 pesetas for every 
metric ton of oranges it exported, 154.4 pesetas in 1900-04, and 138.1 pesetas in 1905-09; Lassala, Nuestra 
exportación, p. 15, Torres and Paris, La naranja, pp. 222 and 253. However, it cost 73 pesetas to produce a 
metric ton of oranges in Spain circa 1890, and 45 pesetas circa 1905; calculations based on Maylín, Memoria, 
pp. 51-52, and Maylín, Manual práctico, pp. 166-7. 
6 Palafox, “Expansión”, p. 328. Palafox: “Estructura”.   6
start to boom until the 1870s, barely two decades before its California counterpart.
7 From 
then to the end of the period we are considering here more than 70 (and often over 90) per 
cent of the harvest was exported.
8 
  At least in the short term, California’s appearance in the citrus industry had very 
little effect on the Valencian economy. Towards the middle of the nineteenth century Spain 
began to send small consignments of its oranges to the east coast of the U.S. This flow was 
stemmed after the near tripling of duties on citrus in the Dingley Tariff of 1897, but the 
U.S. had been a secondary market.
9 What did arouse a great deal of concern among 
Valencian growers was the possibility of the United States becoming an important exporter 
of citrus fruits, since they believed that this would result in their being pushed out of the 
European markets.
10 Indeed their fears were well founded, because California was 
constantly being portrayed as the place where the citrus culture had reached a higher degree 
of perfection. 
  As wheat was replaced by fruits and nuts, California underwent a change from 
large-scale extensive ranching to smaller-scale intensive farming.
11 By European standards, 
however, citrus crops were grown in California on a rather large scale. In Orange County, 
in the heart of the California Citrus Belt, citrus farms had an average size of 40 acres (16 
hectares) in the 1930s.
12 A few large growers owned thousands of acres, hundreds of 
smaller citrus farmers owned “ten or twenty” acres each,
13 and it must been assumed that 
those who owned less than 10 acres were very few in number, because the expression a 
                                                 
7 If we take the Spanish orange exports between 1900-1909 as base 100, the figures corresponding to the five 
previous decades are the following: 1850-59 = 3.3; 1860-69 = 6.7; 1870-79 = 17.9; 1880-89 = 24.3; 1890-99 
= 46.5; Torres and Paris, La naranja, pp. 221-2. 
8 At the beginning of the 1870s 75 percent of the production was exported; Lassala, “Memoria”, p. 14. 
According to Font de Mora, El naranjo, 1935, p. 17, the average was 90 percent throughout the first three 
decades of the twentieth century.  Over the period 1927-36 this figure dropped to 72 percent; Instituto 
Valenciano de Economía, Economia citrícola, p. 48. From the 1960s onwards, the Spanish domestic market 
began to absorb a more significant portion of the output; current consumption stands at over 40 per cent.  
9 Spanish oranges shipped to countries other than Great Britain, France and Germany accounted for only 10.7 
per cent of the total during the period 1850-69, 14.8 per cent (with only 2.4 per cent of the total going to the 
USA) between 1870-74, 4.9 per cent between 1875-96, and 3.9 per cent between 1897-1900. Torres and 
Paris, La naranja, p. 225; and Abela, El naranjo, pp. 170-1. 
10 In the 1870s they already foresaw the chances of a massive influx of U.S. oranges coming into Europe; 
Sanz-Bremón, “Contestación”, p. 273. In the early twentieth century they predicted that this would occur 
following the opening of the Panama Canal; Lassala, Nuestra exportación, p. 47. And in the period 
immediately before the 1929 crash many thought that it was about to happen; Bellver, La naranja, p. 49. 
11 Rhode, “Learning”, p. 773. 
12 Sackman, Orange Empire, p. 283. 
13 The information is provided by Phil Brigandi, in www.cityoforange.org/localhistory/citrus/index.htm.   7
“ten-acre-grower” was used in California as a synonym for a small grower.
14 In Valencia 
orange farms had on average 2 acres (0.8 hectares) in 1920.
15 
  Groves in California were not only bigger than those in Spain, but they were also far 
more capitalised and were run by a different kind of management. “Among all the 
horticultural industries of the United States,” wrote Harry Lawton, “the culture of citrus in 
California is unique. It was established for the most part by retired business or professional 
men from New England and the Central states, usually men of intelligence and education, 
often men who had lost their health in acquiring wealth and who moved here to begin a 
new life in the open air and sunshine”.
16 In California they found vast expenses of cheap 
land and, in a context of falling interest rates,
17 built up plantations using wage labour 
supplied by immigrants from China, Japan and Mexico. Most of them had no previous 
experience as farmers, but they were acquainted with business practices outside agriculture 
which they attempted to apply to the picking, packing, and marketing of fruit. 
 According  to  the  International Year Book of Agricultural Statistics, over the five 
years from 1924 to 1928, 19.8 metric tons of oranges were produced per hectare in Spain, 
whereas the figure was 9.5 tons in the United States.
18 Partly because such high yields were 
obtained in Spain at the expense of quality, during the period 1922-1926 oranges exported 
from the U.S. cost an average of 4.15 dollars/box, whereas the price of Spanish oranges 
was 1.15.
19 The superior quality of California oranges was due to two main reasons. One 
was the fact that fruit was overwhelmingly marketed through cooperatives which incited 
their members to produce high quality fruit, while Spanish cooperatives seldom played this 
role. The second reason was the efficient activity of the agricultural services and the close 
contact (made possible by the mediation of the cooperatives) between scientists and 
farmers, which led to very effective measures to solve problems due to pests, freezing or 
                                                 
14 Moses, “G. Harold Powell”, p. 141. By my reading, there is no other more complete information on the size 
of the California orange farms. We do know, however, that in 1910, in all the fruit-growing counties in the 
state, 16 per cent of the farms had less than 10 acres, 33 per cent had less than 20, and 26 per cent had over 
100; Woeste, Farmer’s, p. 248. 
15 Only 0.2 per cent of the orange growers owned 40 or more acres, 98.9 per cent owned less than 20 acres, 97 
per cent less than 10, and 60 per cent had less than an acre (0.4 hectares). Garrido, Cànem, pp. 105 and 171. 
16 Klotz, Lawton, and Hall, History, p. 6. 
17 Rhode, “Learning”, p. 791. 
18 Quoted by Fontavella, La Huerta, p. 194. 
19 Morilla, Olmstead, and Rhode, “Horn of Plenty”, p. 324.   8
decay of the fruit during shipment.
20 Although Spanish citrus farming also benefited from 
the existence of public research centres, it did so on a far more modest level, and technical 
advances here were much more dependent on the individual efforts made by the farmers 
themselves, and thus on learning by doing.
21 
  The chief citrus cooperative in California, the California Fruit Growers Exchange, 
was a giant that invested huge sums of money in promoting the orange, developed by-
product industries and managed to create the habit of drinking bottled orange juice among 
the inhabitants of the U.S. – 20 per cent of the oranges it supplied in the mid-1930s was to 
be used for juice.
22 In Spain most of the few oranges the home market consumed were 
those deemed to be unfit for exportation, and juice was unknown on a commercial level. 
One obsessive concern of the California Fruit Growers Exchange was the standardisation of 
fruit grades and giving consumers a clear guarantee of what they were buying. As a result 
oranges were packed under a small number of brand names.
23 The success of the 
standardisation process was favoured by the fact that the California horticulturalists, 
following the advice of their cooperatives, focused on growing only two varieties of 
oranges: the winter-ripening Washington navel orange, and the summer-ripening Valencia 
orange. It is said that in Spain up to 30 different varieties (although some of them were 
actually just subvarieties and the presence of others was merely symbolic) were exported in 
the early twentieth century.
24 The advantage of this was that growers could choose the 
variety that best suited the soil and climate in each piece of land they owned and they could 
satisfy the particular tastes of each market,
25 but at the expense of making standardisation 
                                                 
20 Sackman, Orange Empire, pp. 66-83. 
21 The first Spanish research centre devoted to the orange was set up in 1931 in Burjassot (Valencia), where 
there was already another more generic centre that introduced into Spain certain techniques that had been 
developed in California. It did not manage to import the Biological Pest Control or outdoor heater methods to 
prevent freezing, but, from 1907 onwards, it did disseminate the use of fumigation tents and hydrocyanic acid. 
In 1909 it introduced the Washington navel orange and, shortly afterwards, the Valencia orange, which, 
despite its name, was unknown in Valencia; Font de Mora, El naranjo, 1935, pp. 191-5, 206 and 57-59. 
22 Sackman, Orange Empire, pp. 84-116. 
23 The best oranges were classified as “Sunkist”, and represented from a half to two thirds of the total number; 
The Sunkist Growers, Story, p. 5. 
24 Webber and Batchelor, Citrus Industry, p. 95. The tendency to grow a great number of varieties and 
subvarieties had become more pronounced after the First World War, and started to experience a turnaround 
during the 1930s; see Font de Mora, Comercio, 224-6 and 309-11, and Instituto Valenciano de Economía, 
Economía citrícola, pp. 68-9. 
25 For example, the notable increase in the growing of “blood oranges” in Spain in the early twentieth century 
was due to the fact that they were the preferred varieties in Germany, which until then had imported them 
from Sicily.   9
impossible. Exporters used different brand names for the grades of each variety and, as 
there were many exporters, there were a multitude of brands. This made it very difficult to 
promote a particular brand and did nothing to help consumers distinguish between them on 
the basis of their quality. 
  After a talk on the differences between California and Spain in a meeting held in 
1915, one prominent Valencian grower summed up his grief in a single sentence: “We are 
the Anticalifornia!”
26 Although the Spanish citrus industry introduced a great deal of small 
improvements (many of which were adapted from Californian techniques) and in the 1950s 
started to be significantly restructured, it remained very different from the California 
model.
27  In contrast, in the 1930s Jewish orange producers in Palestine had already 
managed to implement many of the methods used in California.
28 It could therefore be 
supposed that the Spanish case was one of frustrated imitation and failure. 
  Yet the truth is that events do not appear to have evolved in a way that was 
particularly detrimental to Spanish interests. As the twentieth century went on, Spain's 
share of the worldwide production of oranges dropped, but the evolution of Spanish orange 
output is perhaps more significant, because it became more difficult for Spain to maintain 
its share as countries where land was an abundant resource joined the orange industry. 
Spain (with 23.5 per cent of the total) was ranked alongside the United States as the world’s 
number one producer during the period 1922-1926.
29 From then on, the accelerated growth 
in the U.S. coincided with the appearance of Brazil, Palestine and South Africa as new 
large-scale producers, and consequently Spain's contribution fell to 12 per cent of the 
worldwide total between 1934 and 1938. By the 1959-1960 campaign it had dropped 
further to only 6.9 per cent, but Spain was then the third most important producer (behind 
the U.S. and Brazil), continued to be the number one exporter, and its production had risen 
by 56 per cent with respect to the average over the period 1922-1926.
30 
Despite all the forecasts, the more expensive American oranges never invaded 
Europe.
31 Indeed, the cheaper Spanish orange never achieved a strong position in the North 
                                                 
26 Tribuna Libre (Vila-real), November 22, 1915, p. 1. 
27 See Abad, Historia (II). 
28 Karlinsky, California Dreaming. 
29 Webber and Batchelor, Citrus Industry, p. 122. 
30 Liniger, L’orange, pp. 14-15. 
31 Over the period 1910-1940 the U.S. exported between 6 and 8 per cent of its orange output annually,   10
American market either.
32 But in view of the respective quality-price relationship, the latter 
seems more difficult to explain than the former. According to Morilla, Olmstead and 
Rhode, from 1910 the U.S. ad valorem rates on orange imports fell to 28 per cent or less, 
and the tariffs would therefore lose their effectiveness. Meanwhile, in the U.S. market, 
California oranges sold for $1 to $3 more than Spanish fruit.
33 This premium could reflect 
the difference in quality, but, although in appearance it was less attractive than the 
California orange, the Spanish fruit was not “bad” – in fact it was eaten by the French or 
German upper classes. Why did it go unnoticed among the American consumers with lower 
purchasing power? And among the juice industry, which consumed lower grades of citrus? 
In actual fact, everything seems to indicate that the Spanish orange industry had 
little interest in undertaking the American adventure, as this would have involved a radical 
change in their methods of production, which were the reason why the Spanish orange was 
not a sturdy traveller and was not able to cross the Atlantic. As an exception, Spain did try 
to direct a greater part of its oranges towards the United States when the First World War 
ended and it took some time before Germany started importing them again. It was precisely 
in that moment when the California growers’ organisations rallied to obtain state and 
federal quality standardisation laws.
34 As a result, the Spanish orange was to encounter 
tremendous difficulties in the future to gain access to the U.S. market, and in 1926, at least, 
there was a ban on importing them. The American authorities alleged the move was made 
because of the presence of Mediterranean fly larvae in some shipments from Spain, but for 
the Spanish Unión Nacional de la Exportación Agrícola it was a “pretext that was put 
forward as a protectionist measure”.
35 Whatever the case may be, it seems that the 
American citrus growers also had reasons to be somewhat concerned about their Valencian 
colleagues. The rest of the paper deals with these Spaniards and their production methods. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
chiefly to Canada; Olmstead and Rhode, “El desarrollo”, p. 443. In the early 1950s U.S. orange growers 
received an export subsidy of 1.25 dollars per box, which was reduced following the intervention of the 
GATT, and done away with in 1956; García-Guijarro, Hespérides, p. 89. 
32 Morilla, Olmstead and Rhode, “Horn of Plenty”, p. 322-3. 
33 Morilla, Olmstead and Rhode, “Horn of Plenty”, p. 324 n. 
34 Moses, “G. Harold Powell”, p. 48; Sackman, Orange Empire, p. 94. Bellver, La naranja, p. 89. 
35 Conferencia Nacional, p. 53.   11
THE EXPANSION OF THE ORANGE INDUSTRY IN VALENCIA 
 
  Table 1 shows some significant data concerning the development of the citrus 
industry in Spain prior to 1936. No official figures are available regarding the amount of 
land given over to growing citrus crops in the nineteenth century, and those that do exist for 
the twentieth century are not particularly reliable. After completing the official data with 
different estimations conducted on the basis of other sources, column I shows that the 
number of hectares dedicated to orange trees in 1900 was 6.2 times the figure for 1872, and 
between 1900 and 1935 became almost 3.5 times larger again. Such figures appear to 
indicate strong growth but, as can be seen in column V, the fact that in both 1910 and 1931 
orange groves only accounted for 0.3 per cent of the total amount of Spanish arable land 
puts this impression into a slightly different perspective. The orange was, nevertheless, one 
of the most intensively grown crops on irrigated land and its contribution to the Spanish 
agrarian product was therefore much greater – 2.6 per cent in 1910 and 9.6 per cent in 1931 
(column VII). All the same, Column VII is where the disproportion between the small 
amount of land devoted to oranges and their importance in the Spanish economy is best 
represented. The fall in Spanish wine exports in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries coincided with the uninterrupted growth, until the 1930s, in the number of 
shipments of Mediterranean agrarian products (vegetables, fresh and dried fruits, olive oil 
or cork) that were sent abroad. The orange became the most important of those 
consignments, especially from the early 1920s onwards, and an essential source of foreign 
currencies for Spain. 
 
 
Table 1: The Spanish orange industry (1872-1935) 
 
 I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII  VIII 
              
1872 (3  546)
1           440  934 
1878 (8  225)
2         2.0  856  502 
1900 (22  125)
3       2 . 2
7 4.9 2  602  257 
1902  42  035  85.9 9.1 2.5      6.8  3  691  996   12
(31 046)
4 













8 6.1 4  972  070 
1922  46  714  78.9  11.3  6.1 0.2   7.6 4  010  491 












   13.4  7  169  939 
1927 57  193  79.9  10.7  6.6      9.8  6  204  875 
1928  61  609  82.4 8.2 6.9      11.8  8  586  164 
1929  66  410  82.6 7.6 6.4      11.3  7  927  571 
1930  71  987  83.6 7.3 6.0      13.2  10  845  390 
1931  72  476  83.8 7.2 6.0  0.3  9.6
9 18.1  8  552  460 
1932  74  638  83.8 7.1 5.8      23.2  8  810  298 
1933  77  146  84.1 7.2 5.9      24.8  9  779  665 
1934  75  096  83.2 7.4 6.4      21.4  8  844  616 
1935  76  793  83.5 7.3 6.2      17.7  7  003  432 
 
Caption: I: Land area devoted to orange trees in Spain (in ha). II: Area devoted to orange trees in the 
Valencian Region (as % of Spanish total). III: Area devoted to orange trees in Andalusia (as % of Spanish 
total). IV: Area devoted to orange trees in the Murcia Region (as % of Spanish total). V: Spanish farmland 
taken up by orange trees (as %). VI: Contribution of the orange to the Spanish agrarian product (as %). VII: 
Share of the orange in Spanish exports (as %). VIII: Volume of Spanish orange exports (in metric quintals). 
 
Notes: 
1 Estimation based on Lassala, Memoria. 
2 Estimation based on Martín, Informe, p. 32, and Abela, El 
naranjo, p. 161. 
3 Estimation based on Maylín, Memoria, p. 21, and Sanz Bremón, Memoria, p. 38. 
5 
Estimation based on Dirección General de Agricultura, El regadío. 
5 Estimation based on Lassala, Nuestra 
exportación, pp. 14 and 69. 





Sources: I-IV: Grupo de Estudios de Historia Rural, Estadísticas; V: Carreras and Tafunell, Estadísticas, p. 
304; VI: Simpson, “La producción”, p. 69; VII and VIII: Torres and Paris, La naranja, pp. 221-2 and 253. 
 
 
In Table 1 it can also be seen that before 1936 the Valencian Region always had 
about 80 per cent of the total amount of land devoted to orange farming in Spain (column 
II). Within the Valencian Region large-scale citrus farming was in turn restricted to a 
handful of districts located on the coastal plains. These can be seen in Figure 1, which 
shows their orange-producing area as a percentage of the total land area given over to 
orange farming in Spain for the year 1922. Owing to the importance that it will later take on 
in our reasoning, we should highlight here the case of the chief Spanish citrus-growing 
district, La Plana, which around 1926 produced about 8.9 per cent of the world’s oranges 
and mandarins and exported more boxes than the joint number exported by the U.S. and   13




Figure 1: Main orange-growing districts in the Valencian Region. 
 
 
The percentage shown refers to the contribution made by each district to the total land 
area devoted to orange growing in Spain in 1922. 
 
Source: Piqueras, La agricultura, pp. 181-182. 
 
 
Despite the apparent prosperity that seems to be reflected by the information in 
Table 1, in the early twentieth century it was often claimed that the greater part of the 
profits generated by the orange industry went to the foreign firms responsible for 
distributing the fruit in the destination markets, while the Valencian growers, after 
assuming heavy investments and a considerable degree of risk, obtained a profit rate of 
only 5 or 6 per cent.
37 Jordi Palafox argued very convincingly against this assertion and 
calculated that, in fact, full-bearing orchards gave profits of over 200 per cent in the late 
1920s.
38 The figures shown in Table 2 are not so outstanding, but are still very high, which 
                                                 
36 I consider that 38 per cent of the Spanish output indicated by Webber and Batchelor (Citrus Industry, p. 
121) for the period 1922-1926 came from La Plana, the same as the 31 per cent of exports in the period 1927-
1931. Between 1927 and 1931 La Plana exported about 8.2 million boxes of oranges annually compared to 
the 3.8 million boxes exported by the United States. 
37 For example, Bellver, Esbozo, pp. 170-197. 
38 Palafox, “Estructura”, p. 350.   14
gives rise to a question: if the orange was such a profitable business in Spain, why did it 
take up prior to 1936 such a small percentage of the country’s arable land? 
 
 

























1888 (a)  1 392  984  408  41 %  13.0 
1888 (b)  1 638  1 254  384  31 %  13.6 
1930 (a)  -  2 648  -  -  - 
1930 (b)  5 000  2 157  2 843  132 %  25.5 
1933  5 250  2 600  2 650  102 %  25.0 
1935
2 -  2  648  -  -  42.0 
 
Notes: 
1 In current pesetas. 
2 Whereas the data for the previous years are mean values, the figures for 1935 are 
those for a 5-hectare orange farm located in the district of Gandia. 
 
Sources: 1856: Vila-real Town Records Office, Padrón from 1856; 1888 (a): Calatayud, “L’expansió 
citrícola”, p. 103; 1888 (b): Gandia Town Records Office, Cartilla evaluatoria de Beniopa from 1888; 1930 
(a): Diario de Castellón, July 27, 1930; 1930 (b): Bellver, Esbozo, p. 169; 1933: Font de Mora, El naranjo, 
1935, pp. 240-2; 1935: Fontavella, La Huerta, p. 206. 
 
 
  Growth of the orange area was subject to two strong restrictions. First, orange trees 
are very sensitive to frosts, which means that they cannot be grown in most of Spain (and in 
most of the Valencian Region). Second, they need a large amount of water for irrigation in 
the hot dry summers of the Mediterranean climate and this was not always available (either 
because it was physically unfeasible or because it was not financially viable, given the level 
of technical development). In consequence, before the second half of the twentieth century 
large-scale orange farming only took place in the few areas of the Valencian Region that, in 
addition to being relatively free of frosts, were situated close to the banks of the few 
moderately plentiful rivers in the region. The spread of orange trees throughout these 
territories, however, was not automatic and occasionally took quite some time to occur.   15
Thus, in 1922, the irrigated area in the province of Valencia consisted of around 110 000 
hectares, but oranges only accounted for 18 per cent of that land, while another 45 per cent 
was dedicated to growing cereals and legumes.
39 According to some scholars, this was the 
result of a third restraint. 
Although the orange fuelled a strong agrarian bourgeoisie, the number of small 
farmers also rose dramatically in the Valencian Region from about 1870 onwards,
40 and it 
has sometimes been claimed that their presence tended to slow down the expansion of the 
orange culture, either due to their decapitalisation or because of their risk aversion.
41 One of 
the main purposes of the next two sections is precisely to discuss this idea. 
 
FROM PEASANTS TO SMALL CITRUS GROWERS 
 
  Small farms played a decisive role in the citrus industry in all the Valencian orange 
districts in the late 1920s. But different paths had been followed to reach that situation: 
while in the north of the Region (province of Castellón) it was already quite apparent in the 
1880s, in the central part of the Region (province of Valencia) the small farmers only 
entered the citrus industry to any significant extent in the twentieth century, and more 
especially after the First World War.
42 
  In 1880, orange trees accounted for 39 per cent of the total irrigated land in the 
district of La Ribera, where 81 per cent of the plantations carried out after 1860 had been 
implemented, after sinking tube wells, on what had previously been unirrigated land.
43 A 
similar situation occurred in the other orange districts in the province of Valencia. As the 
wells and their machinery required heavy investments, they were only available to wealthy 
landowners, and this meant that, in 1860, 55 per cent of the orange trees being grown in La 
Ribera belonged to citrus farms with an area of more than 5 hectares (a considerable size 
                                                 
39 Garrabou, Un fals dilema, p. 176. Cereals included 30 000 ha of rice, which was often grown on land that 
could not really be used for anything else. 
40 Calatayud, Capitalismo agrario. 
41 Palafox, “Expansión”. Roncalés, “Propiedad”. 
42 Around 1860, in the early days of the expansion of the orange industry, the average size of the orange farms 
was only 0.6 hectares in the province of Castellón, compared to 2.1 hectares in the province of Valencia; 
Garrido, Cànem, p. 121, and Calatayud, “La taronja”. 
43 Roncalés, “Propiedad”, pp. 189 and 196.   16
for irrigated land in Valencia).
44 Planting orange trees on the old river-irrigated land 
required less costly investments which even the small farmers could afford,
45 but in La 
Ribera few small farmers actually entered the citrus industry prior 1900. In part, because 
oranges gave only one crop a year that had to be sold, it could not be stored and it was 
ruined from time to time by frosts or strong winds. Consequently, “orange farming has no 
middle ground – it is either a great business or a complete failure”.
46 In contrast, cereals 
rotated with legumes, vegetables and industrial plants. These rotations supplied products 
that were used to satisfy the families’ basic needs and could also be marketed. And, since it 
was unlikely that all the crops being harvested over the rotation cycle would be ruined, the 
peasant household had far less chance of being hit by a total economic disaster than if they 
decided to grow oranges. 
  Moreover, replacing the rotations grown on the traditional irrigated land by orange 
trees entailed a high opportunity cost, because in the nineteenth century the former usually 
provided incomes that were similar to (and sometimes higher than) those deriving from the 
latter.
47 When the profits from oranges soared in the 1920s, the small farmers also 
specialised in growing them. In any case, the fact that until then orange trees were not a 
monoculture on irrigated land does not necessarily imply that the assignation of resources 
was inefficient. This is especially obvious in the district of Gandia. Because this district has 
a microclimate that allows crops to ripen a few weeks before those along the rest of the 
Valencian coast, during the second half of the nineteenth century its irrigated land was 
increasingly given over to growing tomatoes, sweet peppers and other vegetables that were 
exported to Great Britain. The small farmers in Gandia developed a number of highly 
sophisticated farming techniques and the demand for their vegetables continued to be high 
in the twentieth century. As the years went by, however, the district changed speciality – 
orange trees accounted for only 5 per cent of the irrigated land in 1887, 27 per cent in 1910, 
40 per cent in 1921 and 80 per cent in 1936.
48 
                                                 
44 Calatayud, “La taronja”. 
45 Garrido, “Cànem”, pp. 122-124. 
46 Font de Mora, El naranjo, 1935, p. 130. 
47 According to tax-related sources, in Algemesí (La Ribera) in 1888 orange crops provided a profit rate of 41 
per cent, the figure for vegetables was 39 per cent, and 34 per cent for cereals; Calatayud, “L’expansió”, pp. 
103-104. In the same year, in Beniopa (district of Gandia) oranges yielded profits of 31 per cent versus 37 per 
cent for cereals; Gandia Town Records Office, Cartilla evaluatoria de Beniopa from 1888. 
48 Calatayud and Garrido, “La compra”. Fontavella, La Huerta, p. 172.   17
  Unlike what happened in the province of Valencia, in La Plana (province of 
Castellón), the most important orange district in Spain, the groundwater lies deep in the 
earth beneath hard bedrock and, before the improvements in tube-well technology 
introduced in the late nineteenth century, irrigation was absolutely out of the question for 
part of the territory. This is why orange farming spread first through the traditional river-
irrigated areas, and it was only from 1900 onwards when the sinking of wells made it 
possible for citrus fruits to colonise what had hitherto been unirrigated land. 
  The first orange orchards were planted in La Plana around 1815, but their expansion 
was stemmed in the 1860s as a result of a pest – the “gum” – that killed off a large number 
of trees. Once the pest had disappeared, the plantations started growing again in the early 
1870s, now at a tremendous rate. In 1847 oranges only accounted for 1.3 per cent of the 
irrigated area, 9.1 per cent in 1859 and 11.2 per cent in 1871, but from then on its 
expansion rocketed. In 1882 the figure had reached 63.6 per cent, 76.2 per cent in 1885, 
and 87.1 per cent in 1900.
49 
  Paradoxically, in the nineteenth century agricultural technicians advised against 
turning oranges into a monoculture, since they thought that fruit prices would drop sharply 
as a result of over-production.
50 The speed with which the farmers in La Plana hastened to 
become part of the citrus industry, however, was partly conditioned by water availability. 
The expansion of the amount of the river-irrigated land from the late eighteenth century 
onwards resulted in a reduction in the water/land ratio, and many farmers started growing 
oranges because orange trees required less water than other intensive crops. Prior to 1870 
most of the irrigated area was given over to a rotation of cereals and legumes that needed 
an average of 5625 m
3/ha/year, while orange trees only consumed an average of 2800 
m
3/ha/year.
51 Moreover, cereals and legumes were ruined if they did not receive copious 
amounts of water during the frequent years of drought, but in La Plana (which has very 




                                                 
49 Garrido, Cànem, p. 87. 
50 Garrido, Cànem, pp. 117-119. 
51 Ministerio de Fomento, Medios, I, pp. 423-415. 
52 According to Dirección General de Agricultura, El regadío, p. 147. If it ever became necessary to replace 
the orange, wrote the Chief Engineer of the province of Castellón in 1897, “we would find ourselves faced 
with a very difficult problem to solve, because although the conflicts that arise in the low water season are   18
  As in all Valencian orange districs, initially the citrus industry in La Plana had been, 
above all, a matter concerning the middle and larger landowners. Table 3 shows how, in 
1859, these farmers dedicated 11.5 per cent and 10.5 per cent of their land (respectively) to 
orange growing, as compared with only 4.7 per cent in the case of landowners with less 
than a hectare. But in 1885 it was the smaller landowners who lead the field, since at that 
time an average of 80 per cent of their land was used for growing oranges. An extensive set 
of reasons would seem to be necessary to explain why. 
 
 
Table 3: Area of irrigated land used for orange growing in La Plana 
 
Land owned by each group 
dedicated to orange farming (as %) 
 
 
Owners of:     1847   1859          1885 (*) 
 






80.0   (33.2)  
 1-5 hectares  1.7 11.5 79.3   (42.8) 








76.3 (100.0)  
 
(*) In brackets, the percentage of the total amount of irrigated land owned by each group. 
 
Source: Vila-real Town Records Office, Reparto de guardería rural for the years 1847 and 1859, 
and Amillaramiento from 1885. 
 
 
  For centuries, peasants had bred silkworms in their homes. These fed on the leaves 
of the mulberry trees that were planted along the edges of the plots and acted as a source of 
cash income. When the worms were attacked by a pest in the 1850s, the mulberry trees 
were cut down and the small farmers had to look for another cash crop. The reason they 
chose the orange had to do with the fact that, when dedicated to cereals and legumes, much 
of the land belonging to humble farmers was of poorer quality than the rest of the irrigated 
                                                                                                                                                     
now under control (albeit with difficulty), if they were herbaceous plants it would be impossible to resolve the 
conflict and the land would unavoidably lose value”; Maylín, Memoria, p. 35.   19
land, but now it was found that these were precisely the areas where orange trees produced 
higher yields. Although these were the plots that suffered the greatest increases in price, the 
rest of the irrigated land also became more expensive.
53 In that region egalitarian 
inheritance was the norm. This system fragmented the peasant family’s wealth from 
generation to generation and forced the children to seek new land, either by purchasing or 
renting them, in order to avoid landlessness. As the orange tree became more widespread, 
the landlords stopped using tenancy, and at the same time the rising prices made it more 
difficult to buy land. To be able to do so, it was now necessary to become involved in the 
market more than in the past, and this meant to cultivate oranges. But, presumably, what 
pushed the small farmers more than anything else to adopt the citrus culture was an issue 
related to irrigation. 
  When the flow of the rivers decreased in times of drought and water had to be 
rationed, in the Valencian irrigation systems priority was usually given to irrigating staple 
food crops.
54 In the mid-nineteenth century, however, these practices started to be 
questioned. In La Plana conflicts broke out in the 1870s, when a string of heavy droughts 
threatened the investments being made in orange trees. In 1877 the Castellon Town Council 
tried to distribute the water in the same way it had always done in periods of shortage, but 
now the orange growers accused them of imposing an “agrarian socialism”. The following 
year the Irrigation Board (Sindicato de Riegos) in Vila-real restricted water for the orange 
groves, but the provincial governor revoked the order, at the request of a group of wealthy 
landowners, and many small farmers lost their cereal and vegetable harvests.
55 The Board 
appealed before the authorities in Madrid, but they ruled in favour of the governor and from 
then on the restrictions regarding irrigation in times of drought were applied equally to all 
the land, regardless of the crops being grown on them. If, in general terms, the reduced 
water/land ratio acted as a stimulus to plant more orange trees, from 1877 onwards the 
small peasants were more aware of the benefits of doing so: in the future, those who ran a 
                                                 
53 According to Llauradó, Tratado, p. 633, in 1878 the price of prime quality land was 9 000 pesetas/ha when 
dedicated to cereals and legumes, while a hectare of full bearing orange grove cost two to three times as 
much. As was reported some years later, ‘The progressive increase in orange production and exportation 
brought with it a deluge of money. As a result, the number of transactions involving the buying and selling of 
land soared and this eventually reached a point where demand was so high that the price of irrigable land 
became astronomically high’; La Plana, August 18, 1906, p. 1. 
54 Calatayud, “El regadío”, pp. 70-71. 
55 Diario de Castellón, August 25, 1878, p. 2.   20
greater risk of losing their harvests were the farmers who were still tied to higher water-
consuming traditional crop rotation. 
  It would not appear to be an exaggeration to say, then, that peasant households' 
decision to shift to the best crop in order to maximise profits was to a certain extent a 
“forced decision”. In the “forced commercialisation” model proposed by Amit Bhaduri for 
a backward agriculture the result is peasant impoverishment and the stoppage of 
technological improvement.
56 Here, in contrast, the peasants played a decisive role in the 
process of technological advance and adapted themselves to the requirements of the market 
in a way that suited their interests quite well. In this region small peasant ownership was 
already quite common, but orange farming made it even more widespread and, additionally, 
enabled a layer of middle-sized peasant holdings to become consolidated. This was even 
more the case after the sinking of the first motor tube-wells in the unirrigated land around 
the year 1900. 
  In 1927 there were at least 144 motor-driven wells operating in the district. 
Sometimes they irrigated the lands of a single great landowner, but far more frequently they 
belonged to societies of small and middle farmers. In 1909 there were 38 wells in Vila-real, 
31 of which belonged to societies with 1585 members, who “are overwhelmingly small 
landholders, since 1189 of them own plots of land with an area of between 1 and 6 
hanegadas [0.08 and 0.5 hectares]”.
57 The presence of those collectively owned wells led 
many landless workers and small farmers to purchase plots in the cheap unirrigated land. 
They then ploughed them and planted orange trees using family labour. As explained by the 
engineer Font de Mora: “Once a society has sunk the well and found water, the worker has 
to start to drill and chip away the rock that makes up the ground; then, taking advantage of 
days when it was raining or he could find no work, he brought earth from gullies and rivers 
until a workable layer of soil had been created; the hardest part of the work is now finished 
– all he has to do is level off the land, build the irrigation channels [and] plant the orange 
trees”.
58 In order to reduce salary expenses, the wealthy landowners often transformed their 
unirrigated land using the unpaid labour provided by peasant families, who in exchange 
became the owners of a portion of the grove when the orange trees started to yield fruit. “If 
                                                 
56 Bhaduri, Economic Structure. 
57 Comunidad de Labradores de Villarreal, Memoria, pp. 1-2. 
58 Font de Mora, El naranjo, 1935, p. 22.   21
we were to calculate the worth of the work done by the labourers who owned dry-land 
orange groves that they had raised”, concludes Font de Mora, “the remuneration they 
received for their labours is less than the effort they put in, but it allowed them to achieve 
that economic independence so dearly loved by free men”.
59 In truth, relatively few actually 
attained “economic independence”, but the generalised desire to reach it had important 
repercussions on the cost structure of the Spanish citrus industry. 
 
Table 4: Owners of “hectares of orange grove equivalent” in Vila-real (La Plana) 
 
Owners of:  1859 1885 1900 1920 1936 
 









  1-5 hectares  382  654 647 899  970 
 > 5  hectares  43  71 77 117 
 
143 
 Total  2 906  3 263 4 064 5 091  6 506 
 
Sources: Garrido, Cànem, pp. 173-174. And Vila-real Town Records Office, Reparto de guardería rural for 
the year 1936. 
 
  At the beginning of the twentieth century an orange grove with a size of less than 
one hectare (2.5 acres) did not provide enough income to allow an average farmer 
household to live exclusively from working it. At the other extreme, the owners of more 
than 5 hectares (12.5 acres) of orange groves very often used only hired labour and saw 
themselves as “landowners” (propietarios) rather than farmers (labradores). The areas 
lying between these two extremes fulfilled (to widely differing extents) the double 
requirement of being large enough to cover the minimum economic needs of the household 
and also of being small enough to be tilled using basically family labour.
60 As most of the 
landowners owned parcels of both irrigated and unirrigated land at the same time, I have 
used the net returns generated by each crop to reduce the whole cultivated area to “hectares 
of orange grove equivalent”.
61 The results are shown in Table 4, where it can be seen that 
                                                 
59 Ibidem. 
60 Calatayud, Capitalismo, p. 29. Garrido, Treballar, pp. 176-177. 
61 The method employed is explained in Garrido, Cànem, pp. 170-4.   22
the enlargement of the pie thanks to the orange allowed all the groups of landowners to 
increase simultaneously. In each of the years considered, however, about 80 per cent of the 
landowners did not have enough land to be able to subsist without some other source of 
income. In fact, 65.5 per cent of them owned less than half a hectare (1.25 acres) of “orange 
grove equivalent” in 1920. The 4100 hectares that were cultivated in Burriana in 1936 
(almost entirely given over to oranges) were divided up among 5375 landowners, 68 per 
cent of whom had half a hectare or less, and 15 per cent owned plots that were equal to or 
less than a hanegada (0.083 hectares, or 0.21 acres).
62 Most orange groves, then, belonged 
to “labourers” (obreros), “because the main source of income for their owners comes from 
daily wages they earn working for others”.
63 
  If the small farmers used huge amounts of unpaid family work in their groves, the 
presence of a large number of very small farmers had enormous repercussions on the labour 
market and the evolution of salaries. In 1907 the president of the Federación Agraria de 
Levante – a powerful federation that grouped together societies controlled by large 
landowners – drew up a report on the standard of living of wage-earners in the orange 
industry. A “typical” labourer family had an annual income of 1020 pesetas – 680 of which 
came from the father, while the rest were contributed by the mother, who worked in a 
packing house, and small amounts obtained by two children aged between 9 and 12 years 
old. But their expenses – 69 per cent of which was spent on food – amounted to 1281 
pesetas. The labourers were able to support that deficit, the report concluded, because 
nearly all of them had a small piece of land.
64 
  During the 1920s salary costs underwent an upward trend, which was to become 
even more pronounced following the proclamation of the Second Spanish Republic in 
1931, but each social segment of orange growers was affected in different ways. In 1930 
the Castellón Agricultural Cooperatives Federation (Federación Castellonense de 
Sindicatos Agrícolas) drew up another report in which the situation of the Spanish citrus 
industry was portrayed in exaggeratedly gloomy terms; it nevertheless acknowledged that 
the orange district did enjoy an apparent state of “wealth and wellbeing”. According to the 
report, this was largely due to the fact that 80 per cent of the orange-growing area belonged 
                                                 
62 Garrido, Treballar, p. 229.  
63 Diario de Castellón, March 20, 1928, p. 1. 
64 Lassala, “Alimentación”.   23
to farmers who never, or very rarely, engaged hired labour and they themselves usually 
worked as wage-earners for other larger landowners. As a result, the higher the salaries 
were the greater the incomes they obtained.
65 
 
COOPERATION, FERTILISERS AND QUALITY PRODUCT 
 
  In contrast to what happened in California, in Spain relative prices favoured more 
attention being paid to land saving techniques than to labour saving techniques. This 
resulted in high yields per hectare. But as crops were often pushed beyond the limits of 
good farming practice, frequently they produced low quality oranges – the greater the 
yields, the lower the quality of oranges and their unit prices, but the higher the total profit. 
Although they were not the only ones to use it, the large numbers of small and middle 
farmers did help such a strategy to become widely generalised. For small growers, forcing 
production was a way of getting relatively small parcels of land to grant their owners 
“economic independence”. 
  In the average usual type of planting, in California a hectare contained from 212 to 
250 trees.
66 In Spain, the corresponding figure was only 192 in the mid-nineteenth century, 
because, to reduce risks, orange trees were planted “with large separations between them, in 
order to use the remaining soil for other crops”.
67 But in the 1870s planting from 276 to 312 
trees per hectare had already become commonplace, and in the early twentieth century the 
figure rose to around 324.
68 Because their branches almost touched each other, machinery 
could not move along the rows and the groves used up a large amount of human labour. 
  Initially, orange growing had worsened the traditional shortage of manure, because 
livestock lost grazing land. As of 1844, the bottleneck was overcome by importing guano, 
which was used in Valencia only a few years after it was introduced into Great Britain.
69 
When it was replaced by chemical fertilisers in the late nineteenth century, fertilising grew 
                                                 
65 Diario de Castellón, July 27, 1930, p. 1. Salaries accounted for 28.8 per cent of the 2648 pesetas it cost to 
cultivate a hectare of orange trees, while fertilisers consumed another 16 per cent and the rent was a further 
42.8 per cent. 
66 Parker, Manual, p. 10. 
67 Beltrán, La Plana, p. 46. 
68 Respectivamente, Bou, Estudio, pp. 132-133, Bellver, La naranja, p. 169. 
69 Polo de Bernabé, Memoria.   24
and yields rocketed. According to official statistics, the average yields were 15 t/ha in 1881, 
18 t/ha in 1902, and 19.5 t/ha in 1922.
70 Engineers and growers' associations, however, 
claimed in their reports much higher figures. In 1897, for example, they were reported to 
have reached 30 t/ha in full-bearing orchards.
71 Over the coming years it was often said that 
the groves had become “orange factories”,
72 and in an assembly held in 1907 it was claimed 
that yields were 5 times what they had been 25 years earlier.
73 According to Rosón, in the 
1920s the average yield of plantations over ten years old was about 35 t/ha, but there were 
groves that produced 50 and even 60 metric tons.
74 In fact, we know that in 1935 a 5-
hectare farm located in the district of Gandia yielded 42 t/ha of oranges that were fit for 
sale,
75 which means that the overall production (the sum of the oranges that were sold, the 
rejects and those spoilt by the wind) had to be over 50 t/ha. 
  A very reliable handbook stated in the 1930s that the “Comuna” orange required an 
average of 900 kg/ha of chemical fertilisers, while for the “Sanguina” it was advisable to 
use about 1800 kilograms.
76 In fact, during the 1920s the usual amounts had been around 
1500 kg/ha for the former and between 3500 and 6000 kg/ha for the latter.
77 In order to 
raise production as far as possible, the way many growers employed fertilisers was, in 
addition, very unbalanced, with little phosphorous or potash and far too many nitrogenous 
fertilisers, especially ammonium sulphate. It is sometimes claimed that this took place after 
the First World War, but it already occurred before then, although to a lesser extent.
78 It can 
                                                 
70 Simpson, Spanish Agriculture, pp. 140-141. Official statistics do not include the reject oranges, and they 
usually seem to mix bearing and non-bearing (less than 5-year-old) orchards.  
71 Maylín, Memoria, p. 52. 
72 “In order to increase his income, the grower has been using chemical fertilisers without measure, doubling 
the number of trees, to the point where he has turned the groves into orange factories”. Barrachina, La crisis,  
1908, p. 6. 
73 Asamblea Agrario-Naranjera, p. 16. 
74 Rosón, La riqueza, p. 41. Nevertheless, not all that fruit reached the consumer because, on average, 15 per 
cent of the oranges produced were rejects and more than 20 per cent of the remaining harvest was blown off 
the trees by the wind and rotted on the ground. This happened above all with oranges belonging to varieties 
that ripened after Christmas, which reached a higher price the longer they were left on the tree but at the 
expense of greater reductions in the harvest; Sanz-Bremón, Memoria, pp. 2-4. Moreover, due to the 
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According to Bellver, Esbozo, p. 165, during the 1929-30 season 11 per cent of this “good” harvest went to 
waste. 
75 Fontavella, La Huerta, p. 206. 
76 Font de Mora, El naranjo, 1935, p. 138. 
77 Rosón, La riqueza, p. 44. 
78 Barrachina, La crisis, p. 7, states that, around 1905, some growers used more than 1200 kilograms of 
ammonium sulphate per hectare, which allowed them to produce up to 60 T/ha. In Conferencia Nacional,   25
be seen in Figure 2 that during the first two decades of the twentieth century the unit price 
of Spanish orange export decreased, but this did not prevent the amount exported from 
increasing – until the First World War broke out. Despite certain fluctuations, the price of 
ammonium sulphate tended to drop during that period and, if exports grew, it was because 
the increased yields resulting from greater fertilisation led to lower production cost per unit 
and higher total profit. Once the turbulence caused by the First World War had been 
overcome, in 1920-1921 the “golden decade” of the Spanish orange began. The increased 
volume of exports now coincided with a rise in the unit price of the fruit and a substantial 
drop in the price of ammonium sulphate, which was frequently used as the only fertiliser 
because it also became cheaper in relation to phosphor and potassium-based fertilisers. 
 
Figure 2: Indices of orange export price, orange export, and ammonium sulphate price in 























Export price Volum of orange exports Ammonium sulphate price
 
Sources: Torres and Paris, La naranja, pp. 222 and 253. Pujol, “La difusión”, p. 181. Prices are given in 1913 
constant pesetas. 
 
  The information shown in Table 5 confirms the idea that oranges were a 
magnificent business for their growers during the 1920s.
79 Despite the important rise in the 
                                                                                                                                                     
p. 157, it is claimed that such methods became generalised from about 1912 onwards, and that in the early 
1920s a huge number of growers used 2400 kg/ha (“and even more”) of nitrogen-based fertilisers. 
79 The price that growers sold their oranges for was obviously lower than the export price but, in the absence 
of any notable changes in the commercialisation techniques during the period, one must suppose that they 
both evolved at the same pace. The export price is utilised in Table 5 because the price of oranges in the   26
costs of farming per hectare and the drop in the export price between 1930 and 1933, 
profits remained high during this latter year. The crisis of the 1930s would therefore have 
only hit the sector from 1934 onwards, and then just to a moderate extent (as pointed out by 
Torres and Paris in the 1940s
80) if the data for 1935 can be generalised.   
 
Table 5: The cost of growing and the export price of Spanish oranges (1905 = 100) 
 













1905 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1922 94.2 93.3 103.3 
1930 152.0 111.1 174.2 
1933 192.2 137.7 135.1 
1935
2 189.8 84.4 84.8 
 
1 Average values for the specified, next and previous years. 
2 Whereas the data for the previous years are 
averages, the figures for 1935 are those from a 5-hectare orange farm in the district of Gandia. 
 
Sources: The cost of growing in 1893: Maylín, “Memoria”, p. 52; 1905: Maylín, Manual práctico, p. 166; 
1922: Font de Mora, El naranjo, 1922, p. 149; 1930: Bellver, Esbozo, p. 169; 1935: Font de Mora, El 




  Profuse and disproportionate fertilisation nevertheless had a number of drawbacks, 
since it produced sour oranges with a coarse peel, little aroma and a high tendency to go 
rotten during transport. The growers used two systems to sell their oranges to the packers 
and exporters. One consisted in paying an overall amount, the price being negotiated when 
the unripe fruit was still on the trees and nobody could be sure about the effective quality 
and volume of the harvest, while the other method involved paying so much per picked 
unit. With this latter system, the grower received a higher price per unit, but was not paid 
for reject oranges or for the good oranges that fell from the trees before picking. 
                                                                                                                                                     
groves indicated by some of the sources used do not seem to be very representative. 
80 Torres and Paris, La naranja, p. 11.   27
Throughout the 1920s the first method became the most common, as exporters wanted to 
ensure they would have enough fruit to satisfy their orders; this also led to widespread 
encouragement to produce as much as possible. 
  The average quality of the Spanish citrus fruits was poor, but not all Spanish citrus 
fruits were of poor quality. The mandarin (which accounted for 9.7 per cent of all land used 
for growing citrus fruits in Spain in 1936) was a variety with a relatively low yield, but a 
very high average quality. The “Comuna” orange (43 per cent of the citrus area in 1936) 
was situated at the other extreme. And within the so-called “Blood oranges” (34 per cent) a 
large number of different situations coexisted. While some were praised (perhaps with 
more than just a hint of chauvinism) as the best oranges in the world, on other occasions 
they gave middling or bad fruit. 
  There was a heavy demand for cheap oranges in Europe, and if Spain had not 
satisfied it other producer countries would surely have done so.
81 The problem with the 
Spanish citrus industry was that the specialisation of many growers in this type of fruit was 
accompanied by two dysfunctions. On the one hand, the complexity and inefficiency of the 
Spanish system of trade names played against the Spanish exporters specialised in shipping 
high quality oranges, who found it very difficult to build up a reputation for their brands. 
On the other hand, since there were no governmental regulations to defend consumers’ 
rights and in the short term foreign markets absorbed all the oranges that Spain sent, some 
exporters committed fraud. For example, they shipped reject produce under what were 
supposedly high quality brand names, or sent under-ripe or frost-damaged fruit. As each of 
the two dysfunctions reinforced the other, in the end the undermining of the consumer's 
confidence due to such fraudulent practices not only affected unscrupulous exporters but 
also the whole Spanish citrus industry. Over the period 1883 to 1936 frosts affected some 
                                                 
81 As two renowned economists wrote in the late 1940s: “The decisive factor for the price of the [Spanish] 
orange is the price on the international market, and thus a restricting our offer would have only given rise to 
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possibilities of success of the agricultural cartels. The California growers’ specialisation in high quality 
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protectionist measures hampered the entrance of produce from other countries. Italian orange and lemon 
export to North America dropped after the rise in tariffs in 1897, but the Italian orange was also driven out of 
the German and French market by the cheaper Spanish orange. In part, South Africa and Palestine opted for 
high quality oranges because they could not compete price-wise with Spain.   28
parts of the Valencian orange area in at least 25 years.
82 Although the damaged fruit was 
often exported afterwards, usually only small lots were affected and the impact on business 
was not very significant. Two frosts that did affect the whole orange-growing region in 
December 1925 and January 1926 did give rise to a generalised commotion, but the 
business soon recovered from them. Yet it was not so easy to get over the disaster that 
occurred when shipments abroad were not cancelled after the widespread frosts of 1933, 
since this had a greater effect on the fall in the volume and value of exports during 
subsequent years than the tariffs applied by Great Britain to Spanish oranges as a 
consequence of the Imperial Preference system that was agreed in Ottawa in 1932.
83 
  This kind of behaviour would have been unthinkable in California, owing to 
government legislation and the quality policy followed by the cooperatives. The first 
Spanish decrees with practical repercussions concerning the marketing of the orange were 
passed in 1935. And, as far as marketing the output was concerned, the orange cooperatives 
had very little say before the 1980s.
84 At the beginning of the twentieth century, the most 
powerful agrarian cooperatives in the whole of Spain were set up in the irrigated areas of 
the Valencian Region. Orange growers predominated among their members. They used 
cooperation to gain access to loans, to fight against pests or to purchase chemical fertilisers. 
Indeed, Spanish small citrus farmers were able to use huge amounts of fertilisers largely 
thanks to the low prices fixed by the cooperatives and the low-interest loans they offered 
members when they did not have cash to buy them.
85 Nevertheless, only a few Valencian 
cooperatives marketed and exported oranges, and usually they were weak societies. In 1905 
the California Fruit Growers Exchange marketed 45 per cent of the citrus fruit shipments 
from California, and 72 per cent in 1920.
86 As of 1908 a Federación Naranjera was 
constituted in Spain, but during the 1911-1912 season (the one in which citrus export 
                                                 
82 Abad, Historia, p. 68. 
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superphosphates; Garrido, Treballar, p. 261. 
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cooperatives were most active before the 1970s) it only shipped 5 per cent of all Spanish 
orange export.
87 
  According to the organisational model adopted by nearly all the exporting 
cooperatives, their members were obliged to market absolutely all their oranges through 
them and they, in turn, had to buy all their members’ oranges, including rejects.
88 But, 
unlike when the future harvest was sold to an exporter for a fixed amount, the cooperative 
only paid for the fruit that was on the tree at harvest time. Since picking had to be carried 
out in different stages throughout the season, the longer the delay, the more likely the 
groves were to lose all or part of their harvest. For this reason, many growers did not want 
to renounce the freedom to sell their oranges whenever, however and to whomever they 
wanted, and did not become members of an export cooperative. They did, however, usually 
belong to a cooperative that bought and sold fertilisers or a society that offered a tube-well 
for collective use. 
  In a context in which it was easy to sell the harvest individually, and in which it was 
therefore difficult to impose effective sanctions on those who contravened the statutes, 
being a member of an export cooperative brought with it a high moral hazard. Members 
often sold the better part of their harvest to private dealers for a higher price, and at the 
same time they were very strict about demanding that the cooperatives accept their worst 
oranges and so the result was that the packing houses run by the cooperatives were filled 
with “fruit that was not only dubious, with a questionable health and resistance, but also 
produce that the least scrupulous merchant would reject as inadmissible on the day before 
he went bankrupt”. According to the report that the previous quote was taken from, of the 
oranges sent in Liverpool in 1913 between five well-reputed Spanish exporters, 78 per cent 
were first quality grades, 20 per cent were second quality and 2 per cent were third class. 
Of the fruit that the Federación Naranjera sent to that destination, only 18 per cent were 
first class, 60 per cent were second class and the remaining 22 per cent were third or fourth 
grades, the latter being used exclusively by the cooperatives.
89 In view of all the foregoing, 
it is not so difficult to believe another piece of criticism aimed at them: because the orange 
cooperatives were shaky enterprises and offered their employees poor wages and scant 
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chances of promotion, their managing directors were usually people with little professional 
worth whose way of running the business made any hope of improvement but an illusion. If 
the cooperatives played a crucial role in the California citrus industry’s decision to aim 
towards a high quality product, not only did the Spanish orange cooperatives fail in this 
goal, but additionally their image was long associated with the worst fruit it was possible to 




  In contrast to California, increasing the area of land devoted to citrus was no simple 
matter in Spain with the technology available in the first half of the twentieth century. By 
1920 it was said that in the Valencian Region they were ploughing unirrigated land in 
which sinking tube-wells and “creating” farmable soil was relatively cheap, but where 
frosts were a frequent occurrence that drove growers to bankruptcy. At the same time, 
extending citrus farming out in places with satisfactory climactic conditions often required 
such large investments that the operation became economically unfeasible. As we have 
seen, initially the need to save water led many farmers to plant orange trees, but soon after, 
when orange crops had taken up most of the traditional irrigated land, the shortage of 
irrigation water restrained further expansion of orange farming. If we also take into account 
that before the spread of cooperatives capital markets were fragmentary and the small 
farmers had no easy access to credit in Spain,
90 the Spanish citrus industry’s capacity to 
meet the growing demand in the industrialised countries of Europe is particularly striking. 
  When California became an important producer of citrus fruits Spain had been in 
the same situation for barely twenty years, and the Valencian Region could have been 
unable to increase its supply to keep pace with the growth in demand in Europe. If this had 
been the case, it would have benefited California, which would have exported a greater 
percentage of its orange output. Or perhaps, for geographical reasons, Florida would have 
channelled its oranges towards Europe. This would have left the U.S. domestic market 
almost entirely in the hands of California, which would have assigned fewer oranges to the 
bottled juice and by-product industries, with the subsequent increase in average price of the 
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fruit. It is an exercise that does not appear to arouse much interest but, from a formal point 
of view, it makes as much sense to calculate how much more Spain would have grown 
without the existence of the California citrus industry as calculating how much more 
California would have grown if the Valencian orange industry had not been as dynamic as 
it was. Considering this issue makes no more sense beyond just that – to stress the fact that 
the Valencian orange industry was really very dynamic. 
  In particular, this dynamism was made possible by the effects of two phenomena. 
On the one hand, many Valencian growers were small and middle farmers who used huge 
amounts of unpaid family work, which allowed them to undertake operations that would 
have been financially disastrous with hired labour. On the other hand, the early days of the 
twentieth century witnessed the advent of a powerful cooperative movement in the orange-
growing areas that allowed small growers access to cheaper credits, fertilisers or 
insecticides. The California Fruit Growers Exchange managed to act as a cartel and restrict 
the offer of oranges on the U.S. market so that prices rose.
91 Insisting that members of the 
cooperatives produce only high quality oranges was one of the main instruments used to 
achieve this, since with similar yields to those obtained in Spain the California orange 
harvest every year would have been two – and probably three – times higher than it was. 
The Valencian cooperatives also wanted to reduce the output and produce higher quality 
fruit, but they clashed with the preferences of their members (mainly small and middle 
farmers) and failed in the attempt. 
  In any case, the Valencian growers who specialised in producing cheap fruits for 
European consumers with less purchasing power did not seem to have been mistaken, 
because before the 1930s this was a very profitable business for them. The period of 
hardships they underwent as of 1933 was followed by the 1936-39 Spanish Civil War and 
by an enormous scarcity of fertilisers in the 1940s, as a result of the international isolation 
of Spain during the early years of Franco’s dictatorship. Nevertheless, oranges then became 
a magnificent business again. The changes in the standards of living and in the tastes of 
Europeans led to the disappearance of a strong demand for low quality fruit after the 
Second World War. The Spanish orange industry, however, was able to adapt itself by 
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changing the types and quality of the varieties it grew.
92 
  For some scholars, the citrus industry succeeded in becoming very dynamic in Spain 
despite the large number of small farmers involved in it. What has been defended here is 
that, to a large extent, it was thanks to the abundance of these small farmers that it actually 
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